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ABSTRACT
Given the low cost of most cubesat missions, a full implementation of the traditional space systems engineering
process to cubesat missions can be detrimental to programmatic success of the cubesat. At the other extreme, cubesat
missions often suffer predictable consequences from the omission of standard systems engineering processes such as
risk management, configuration management, and quality assurance. In this paper we discuss a scaled systems
engineering approach to cubesat missions implemented on a programmatically constrained mission. A discussion of
each of the standard systems engineering processes and options for tailoring the processes for a constraint-based
mission and how this varies from the typical top-down mission processes. The intent is to inform the decisions of
mission developers in determining what level of rigor is appropriate for each process in their unique circumstances
and mission needs. Examples of tailoring processes utilized with missions currently underway at the Air Force
Research Laboratory's Small Satellite Branch (AFRL/RVEN) are used to illustrate the application of the information
presented.
CONSTRAINT-DRIVEN DESIGN

While Class D missions can be applicable to any size of
space system, the reality is that small satellites generally
do not meet the intent of Class D. The growing
prevalence of small satellites are also starting to violate
the assumptions Class D was predicated on: that these
are one-of-a-kind. Class D is a higher risk posture but
has evolved (or always was) assuming a relatively high
probability of mission success. The small satellite
community, and the design principles therein, have
evolved from the concept of pushing the boundary on
faster innovation. The small satellite community’s
innovation cycle was enabled by the community
adoption of the containerized 1U standard. This standard
has since been adapted to larger form factors but the
fundamental design trades were developed in a form
factor that were amenable for wide spread adoption.
This standard has allowed the community to focus on
innovation in processes and platform capabilities
atypical of larger scale missions.

Small satellites are seeing significant utilization because
they are intended to be both lower cost and more rapidly
deployed; these attributes allow for a much wider range
of people and organizations to build spacecraft. While
small satellite platforms are not nearly as capable as their
larger, more ‘traditional’ counterparts, they are
facilitating large growth and investment. Since just 2015
well over 600 CubeSats have flown [1, 2] and it is
expected that much greater adoption of the small satellite
form factors will continue with investments on the order
of tens of billions of dollars [3, 4]. The schedule and cost
savings appear, so far, to have justified the reduced
capability imposed by this smaller form factor.
With the growing interest, and investment, in these
platforms there is a growing level of scrutiny being
applied to the small satellite industry. Common space
industry practices are being applied to small satellites
that have been developed for larger one-of-a-kind space
assets [5, 6]. Essentially, many organizations are
attempting to develop small satellites to Class D or (the
ambiguous) sub-Class D level of system engineering and
mission assurance.
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Further, these systems are greatly constrained and often
are not capable of achieving something like Class D. The
form factor imposes many physics-based limitations
(volume, mass, power), many technologies are relatively
low Technical Readiness Level (TRL), and the greater
space industry holds many misperceptions about these
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vehicles (e.g. 50% of all small satellites are dead on
arrival to orbit; the actual number is more like 17% [1,
2]). Because of the perception that these spacecraft are
cheaper and faster, their schedules and budgets are often
more static than the traditional “big space” paradigm.
This drives capability, system engineering processes,
and mission assurance.

In order to be constraint-driven and reap the benefits of
faster and cheaper, a mission’s scope must be well
defined and limited [8] or the scope must be flexible to
reductions as constraints are realized. This idea can be
challenging and even abrasive to much of “big space”
but it is familiar to many small satellite crafters [2].
Assuming this step can be taken with mission
stakeholders, the next most important attribute to a
constraint-driven mission is scaling the systems
engineering practices: the focus of this paper.

It is recognized within the small satellite community that
high levels of system engineering and mission assurance
processes can reduce the innovative intention of small
satellites. Where possible, the idea that a small satellite
mission will “fit the box” instead of “building the box”
has been utilized to help scope missions implemented in
a small satellite form factor, as shown in Figure 1. While
these ideas have been in the small satellite community
for years, they have only recently been more directly
discussed [7, 8, 9].

It is a common refrain for those working on small
satellites that certain practices are not conducted
“because it’s a SmallSat”. This is, in of itself, not
sufficient or technically correct. Small satellites go
through all of the same phases and steps as any space
vehicle however there are many practices and processes
that are either done on a very small scale or not
applicable. The processes also tend to be iterative versus
serial, with smaller scale processes happening
throughout the mission lifecycle. Tailoring of these
practices and processes to be constraint-driven is
discussed and recommendations are made based upon
experience from various AFRL programs and the
University NanoSatellite Program. Further, discussion of
good practices for improving resilience/robustness of
space vehicles, without necessarily increasing system
engineering or mission assurance burden, are discussed.

Constraint-driven design is where schedule, cost, and
existing limitations (both technical and policy) drive the
mission scope and execution plan. This is, so far, how
most small satellite platforms have been designed and is
in contrast to the “big space” requirements-driven
paradigm. Requirements-driven design prioritizes
mission scope over schedule, cost, or other limitations
that may drive larger development efforts.

Figure 1: Constraint vs. Requirements driven missions [7]
VITALITY OF MISSION SCOPE

result should be. Detailed (or deep) requirements are still
necessary but they are only created when they are
needed. It is important through this process to not overdefine the solution space but rather the problem that
needs to be solved.

Unlike the wide and deep requirements of the traditional
spacecraft development approach the requirements in a
constraint driven model are kept at a high level and
focused on the specific capability that is required to be
demonstrated on orbit. The scope should cover the
overall definition of what the mission is supposed to
accomplish and a specific description of what the end
Clements

The key piece of information here that drives scope is the
Minimum Viable Product which is tied directly to the
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capability that should be validated on-orbit. Each
capability has at least one on orbit demonstration
associated with it for on-orbit validation purposes. Note
that if there is not an on-obit test associated with the
capability then the associated development is descoped
from the mission. This scoping effort drives many of the
systems engineering design trades that are determined
through a mission lifecycle and fundamentally bound the
programmatic constraints of the mission.

Table 1. Systems engineering processes
Technical Management
Processes
•
•
•

In constraint driven models the scope of a mission is
controlled not fixed. It is expected that the scope will
change throughout the mission lifecycle; this change is
documented throughout
mission lifecycle at
programmatic reviews. It is critical that programmatic
discipline is maintained to only add capabilities when
they have made space by removing other capabilities
first. Scope creep, where mission stakeholders add
desired capabilities outside the necessity of the
Minimum Viable Product, is a real danger to the success
of a mission.

•
•
•
•
•

It is critical to document exactly how and when a
mission’s objectives are to be achieved by showing the
major products, milestones, activities, and resources
required for the mission. In traditional management the
scope, cost and schedule imply high quality attributes
which is locked down at the start of the project,
conversely, in a constraint driven model the mission
should deliver the desired scope, in the time allowed,
within the budget allocated, and to the quality aspired to.
The systems engineering processes tailoring therefore is
a conversation between all stakeholders which is clearly
defined at the beginning of a mission, so that mission
expectations and programmatic constraints can be
realized as early as possible in the mission lifecycle.

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Mission Analysis
User Requirements
Definition
System Requirements
Definition
Architecture
Definition
Design Definition
System Analysis
Implementation
Integration
Verification
Transition
Validation
Operation
Maintenance
Disposal

TECHNICAL MANAGEMENT PROCESSES
Accurate project planning is generally considered the
most difficult of the tasks that systems engineers are
assigned. One often quoted rule of thumb is to multiply
your most accurate cost and schedule estimate by pi
(3.14) to get a realistic estimate, or the constant e (2.72)
if you’re feeling optimistic. While there are always
unknowns that will trip up any program plan, there needs
to be a recognition that there are significant outside
factors that drive this perception. One significant one is
the inherent optimism that is required when making a
program plan under competitive circumstances. A
green-light schedule that assumes zero problems will
always be unrealistic, especially under cost-plus
contracting; Firm-fixed price contracting has a strong
tendency to bring clear-eyed realism to cost and schedule
discussions, with those most familiar with the challenges
of the project able to inject their concerns into the
planning process.
This, in turn, forces difficult
discussions significantly earlier in the program,
requiring more realistic cost-benefit trades to be made at
the user level, and helps temper unrealistic expectations
from mission sponsors. Cost overruns are still a
significant fact of life, but when constraints imposed on
missions are rooted in reality and cancellation is more
than a threat, but a valid option for a program, cost and
schedule realism can become part of the organizational
culture.

SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESSES
Though there are several definitions of the various
systems engineering processes in use today this paper
will reference the IEEE 15288 definitions and process
breakdown. Table 1 presents the processes that we will
be discussing in this paper, broken down into Technical
Management Processes and Technical Processes
following the breakdown given in the DOD Best
Practices for Using Systems Engineering Standards
document [10]. Note that several of the processes called
out in 15288 are considered out of scope for this paper,
consisting of Acquisition, Supply, Life Cycle Model
Management, Infrastructure Management, Portfolio
Management, Human Resources Management, Quality
Management, and Knowledge Management. Though
critical to the success of an organization, this paper will
be neglecting discussion of the larger processes and
focusing on the processes that are within the scope of a
single project.
Clements

Project Planning
Project Assessment
and Control
Decision
Management
Risk Management
Information
Management
Configuration
Management
Quality Assurance
Measurement

Technical Processes

Generally, even the cheapest missions will still undergo
the full review process that is inherent in the Project
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Assessment and Control process. Tailoring is applied to
the individual review, with a certain level of informality
and relaxation of rigor to the requirements that are levied
at each review. One critical piece that is shared between
this and the Decision Management process is to push the
decision making power as far down the organization as
possible [7]. This has the effect of minimizing the need
to bring the reviewers up to speed on the current state of
the mission and allows the review to focus on the current
issues that need addressing before moving forward.
Continuity of management (driven by short schedules)
also helps this process drastically, maintaining
familiarity with the mission and knowledge of the
previous decisions.

with appropriate explanation by the acting person. Flight
hardware handling practices include ESD safety,
smocks, hairnets, gloves, and a class 10K clean
environment.
Measurement processes are generally associated with
tool location and calibration tracking. Poor calibration
practices can come back to damage a spacecraft in the
most inopportune times, giving little options to scale
back calibration practices. In general, tools lost inside
spacecraft hardware can be mission ending, but with
spacecraft as small as these there are few opportunities
to misplace tools.
For many of these systems engineering processes there
is the recognition that while process can improve
consistency, in can also reduce individual responsibility
and ownership. Delegation of authority is critical to
improve ownership and responsibility such that
relaxation of process can reduce cost and schedule
without catastrophic results.

Risk management is generally one area where process is
tailored generally falls to an identification of the primary
risks at every review, with appropriate mitigation as it
relates to the mission success. For many missions, large
risk items that would be unacceptable for higher class
missions are routinely accepted, such as the use of
industrial quality electronics and unknown radiation
susceptibility (generally a community practice).
Mitigating the lack of more structured risk management
is the smaller teams that are enforced by the low budgets
of these missions. The improved communication
amongst the small team allows the systems engineers to
discover the risks inherent in specific courses of action.
Also key is having the expertise available necessary to
understand new found risks and mitigations quickly.

TECHNICAL PROCESSES
The technical processes in Table 1 generally follow a
mission flow, with the exception of the System Analysis
process, which is cross cutting throughout the mission.
Figure 2 shows the connection between the processes
and the mission lifecycle for a satellite mission.
Concept development
The early stages of mission lifecycle are likely the least
well defined. The goals of the early stages of mission
development is to identify a self consistent set of mission
objectives, requirements, and architecture that are
feasible within cost and schedule constraints.
Sometimes this is straight forward, such as when a
customer approaches with a well scoped component test
idea. Usually there will be several iterations of concept
development, including cost and schedule estimates,
returning to the customer to discuss options and
possibilities, before a committment is made.

The adoption of new toolsets such as Confluence or other
wiki-based systems has enabled significantly lower
friction information management processes than
predecessor file-based toolsets.
Accompanying
delegation down the organization structure of approval
and review authority, as well as relaxation of some of the
related formalisms also simplifies and speeds
information transfer through the wiki-based toolsets.
Configuration management and quality assurance are
often lumped together because of the overlap in both
objectives and processes. A significant relaxation that is
applied is the ability to work both tests and assembly
procedures without detailed procedures. When the test
requirements and test flow has been discussed with the
appropriate approvers the test can be run and
documented live, providing a significant speedup.
Integration
with
the
wiki-based
information
management system has also improved the ability to
capture critical information from the procedure. Some
relaxation of the standard two person rule has been
tolerated, mostly in relaxing the knowledge requirements
of the second person, where a tech or engineer with
unrelated expertise can review and sign off on an action
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Concept development generally consists of rapid
iterations on the systems budgets, such as
communications, power, pointing, navigation, etc.,
evaluating changes to the mission and experiment
CONOPS enabled by various options. Impacts to the
requirement set and system architecture guide new
decisions. Key performance parameters drive decisions
and guide the selection process.
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IEEE 15288
SE Phases

Systems Engineering Activities
and System Interactions

Lifecycle Activities

1) Mission
Analysis
2) User Reqmts
Definition

• Mission Statement & Objectives
• CONOPS & Use Cases
• Constraints
Feedback,
Reality Check,
Iteration

• Requirements Analysis

3) System Reqmts
Definition

 SRR – Decision Point
4) Architecture
Definition

• Architecture & System Definition
 PDR – Decision Point
•
•
•
•

5) Design
Definition

Baseline
Specifications

Design to Requirements
Make / Buy
Software Architecture
S/W & H/W Prototyping

6) System Analysis
Systems Design Model Rev. 1
• CONOPS
• Constraints
• Requirements
• Architecture
• Performance Budgets
• Cost

Availability &
Performance

Evolution

 CDR – Decision Point
• Procurement
• Fabrication
• EM & FM

7) Implementation

Specs

• Flatsat / EM Integration
• Functional Test Dev.
• Flight S/W & Ground S/W Dev.

Results
ICDs

Systems Design Model Rev. 2
• CONOPS
• Constraints
• Requirements
• Architecture
• Performance Budgets
• Cost

8) Integration

9) Verification

10) Transition

11) Validation
12) Operation
13) Maintenance

Operations Exercises, Rehearsals, and Dress Rehearsal

 IRR – Decision Point

Evolution

• Flight Integration
• Electrical, Mechanical, & S/W
• Functional/Performance Testing

ICDs
Reqmts
Results

 TRR – Decision Point
• Environmental Testing

Reqmts

Systems Design Model Rev. 3
• CONOPS
• Constraints
• Requirements
• Architecture
• Performance Budgets
• Cost

 PSR – Decision Point
• Launch Preparation & LBCT
 MRR – Decision Point
Model
Validation

• Launch
Performance
Predictions

• L&EO Operations
• Nominal Operations

Mission Planning Toolset
• On Orbit Handbook
• Flight Rules
• Operations Procedures
• Experiment Plan
• Space Vehicle Handbook
• Performance Budgets
• Mission-Unique Planning
S/W

Performance Predictions

• Program Final Reports
• Lessons Learned
14) Disposal

• End of Life Disposal

Figure 2. Systems engineering processes and the mission lifecycle.
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The baseline for the system is implemented and
documented in a system design model which consists of
the CONOPS, requirements and constraints with
functional, performance, and environmental testing
defined, architecture, and the performance and cost
budgets. Further detail is required in a risk assessment
and mitigation plan. The generation of a self consistent
system design model is necessary to progress to PDR.

mission logic may be able to fit in basic microcontrollers,
significantly reducing the time and financial investment
required for the software development.

This top level description of the concept development
process most likely applies across all mission classes, the
key ideas that change with mission class is that process
is looking for a well scoped minimum viable product that
there is reasonable agreement is worthwhile to embark
on for the cost and schedule resources available. This
can be low risk, such as a widget testing mission, or high
risk, such as attempting to interface with a global satcom
constellation that

Certain judicial enhancements to the mission at this
design stage can minimize cost and personnel
commitments during both testing and operations. One
requirement that is generally carried on AFRL/RVEN
missions is to be power positive in a tumble. This
requirement enables the critical components to be
reduced to the power, TT&C, and connecting
subsystems (usually command and data handling). The
elimination of the attitude determination and control
subsystem from the system safe mode allows for both
simplified operations (e.g. business hours only,
progressing to unattended operations), and a reduction in
testing in the ADCS system, due to the knowledge that it
is not a critical subsystem.

Design definition

System analysis

Between PDR and CDR the design is fleshed out through
procuring or developing the subsystems and components
that meet the detailed requirements. One simplification
applied is a strong preference towards buy in make/buy
decisions. Full design rigor is generally expected when
the decision is to make the component in house.

The system design model is the central analysis tool that
supports the systems analysis portion of the systems
engineering process. The model captures the mission
and experiment CONOPS, the requirements flowdown,
product break down and work break down structure, and
the ICDs.

One simplification to the review and approval process
that can be adopted is a peer technical review, which is a
detailed, but often informal, assessment of the work
conducted on a component, subsystem, system, etc. The
intent is to get a second set of eyes to better catch errors,
omissions of best practices, cross pollinate ideas, and to
provide more cross-team communication. This review
may come from a subject matter expert or similarly
skilled engineer from another project.

The interaction between the system design model and the
system changes throughout the mission lifetime. Most
of the design work on the mission occurs in the system
design model prior to PDR. Between PDR and CDR the
model is updated to reflect component availability and
feasibility, cost benefit analyses, design trades, and
evolving schedule and cost constraints. The final
CONOPS scenarios, design, and expected performance
are captured at CDR.

In many cases it is quicker and cheaper to begin
prototyping early in this process, allowing the engineers
to evaluate design and component selection decisions
while providing time to correct mistakes. The increasing
complexity the various ICs available today increases the
challenge of catching errors at the schematic level, often
the only way to determine if a chip can perform the
required task is to prototype the circuit and work out the
proper settings by hand.

After CDR the model serves as the basis for defining test
campaigns and incorporating test results into
performance predictions. The model informs flatsat,
hardware-in-the-loop and software-in-the-loop testing
and provides the proper location to incorporate the
record as-built performance and calculate system
margins and capability. It also provides the ability to
analyze the impact of a failed test and informs the
decision to modify the design, modify the test, or accept
it as is with a waiver.

Canonically, software development work prior to CDR
should be limited to architecture, prototyping, and
planning. However, most missions can attest to the
wisdom of an early start to the software development. In
this case, the use of non-EEE parts can significantly
enhance the capability of the processing on the
spacecraft, and has enabled significant sophistication in
the flight software of cubesat missions. At the same
time, if mission scope can be reduced sufficiently the
Clements

In AI&T, the model helps specify the functional and
environmental testing to ensure a test-as-you-fly
approach. As final testing wraps up the model is used to
develop operations plans and a mission planning toolset
for use during early, nominal and contingency
operations.
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Implementation

alignments, and less on the integration of more robust
systems.

The functions of implementation are the procurement
and fabrication of the various parts, components, and
subsystems. One particularly powerful simplification of
this process in the use of a flatsat, where non-flight
boards and harnesses are electrically integrated in a
tabletop setting. This encourages rapid identification
and correction of flaws in design, ICD mismatches, and
most non-mechanical issues. The flatsat allows for
breaking connections and break-out box level
verification of key measurements that are infeasible after
mechanical integration

The testing and verification of constraint-driven
missions also varies significantly from the traditional
paradigm. While the same objectives of verifying that
the system will survive launch and perform the mission
objective still apply, the level to which this verification
is performed is where constrain-driven missions vary the
most. For these missions, it has been found the that the
greatest return on investment comes from the following
basic tests:
Functional Day-in-the-Life (DITL)

The flatsat also allows for early functional test
development, which provides time for iteration on the
functional test procedures and helps in catching design
flaws, allowing for later flight hardware functional tests
to only focus on workmanship flaws. A heavy focus is
placed on test scripting.

DITL testing, when properly designed, should accurately
demonstrate the critical functionality of the spacecraft.
This usually focuses first on initial startup and system
checkout and then exercises the operational modes.
Some simple error detection and recovery testing may be
performed but it is not the intent of constraint-driven
DITL to exercise all of the edge cases but to simply
verify that the system performs as intended. This test
specifically includes the launch and early operations
sequence.

The flatsat also provides an ideal platform for flight
software testing. The acceleration of flight software
development on the flatsat is likely sufficient
justification for the apparent extra effort even without the
other advantages described here.

Power Characterization

Assembly, Integration, & Testing

As the power subsystem represents the lifeblood of the
spacecraft, significant efforts are expended to verify the
full functionality of the subsystem. This includes
verification of the depth of discharge, recharge through
solar panels, autonomous recognition of safety limits on
the battery, proper inhibit functionality, load testing and
switching, and proper telemetry production.

The AI&T phase of any mission can make or break both
a mission’s schedule and budget. During this phase of
mission development, many of the investments or shot
comings made in the earlier missing phases are realized.
Traditional mission AI&T focuses heavily on the
carefully developed integration procedures with multiple
levels of inspection and may even include the
construction of an engineering unit to test these
procedures. These practices, while well suited for
Requirements-driven missions, significantly increase
both the cost and schedule for the mission. For
Constraint-driven missions, similar levels of mission
assurance can be achieved through the application of
some simple design practices and lean integration
processes specifically applied to mission critical
integration activities.

Long Range Communications Verification
Small satellite systems present a unique opportunity to
test a full end to end communications path of the satellite
that simply could not be performed with larger systems.
Due to their size, the satellite can either be tested by free
air radiating with a significant distance between the test
antenna and the satellite or even with an actual ground
station asset. It has been found that many issues can be
discovered by performing a long range test that would
otherwise be missed when using either an antenna hat or
performing attenuated hardline tests.

In general, small satellite missions are designed and built
by much smaller teams than their traditional
counterparts. This allows the design team to also act as
the AI&T team. Having these functions so closely
coupled allows the AI&T team to become experts with
their system during the design and since they don’t
handoff AI&T to a separate team, there is less need to
meticulously design integration procedures. With this
level of understanding of the design intent, procedures
can focus on critical integration activities, such as optical
Clements

Command and Execution Test
Full verification of the software functionality is required,
though there is some flexibility on whether that is
performed on the flatsat, flight vehicle, or a simulator.
This is an execution of each command in the Command
and Telemetry List (CTL). The depth to which all the
various permutations of arguments for each command is
verified is allowed to fluctuate depending on the mission.
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This operations method is achieved through the careful
design of the constraint-driven system to include two
design principles. The first of these is a tumble proof
COM link. By providing a communications link that can
still close the link with the ground even in a tumble,
operators can recover the vehicle from anomalies much
quicker as well as monitor the system state of health even
in if it currently is unable to recover from a current power
condition. Once the power system recovers, operators
can then proceed with bringing the system back online.

Full Functional Test
Functional testing on the balance of the subsystems is
allowed to stay at a high level, emulating the expected
use cases that each component may see in operations. If
failures are encountered further investigation is required.
Often there are edge and corner cases that are not well
explored or tested, and these can be discovered on orbit.
The expectation is that as long as the critical subsystems
are well characterized these faults are recoverable and
can be dealt with during operations.

The second operations enabling principle is to utilize the
DITL testing to develop mission operations scripting. By
developing and utilizing this scripting during the testing
phase, these command sets can be “canned” and used for
future operations. By designing in this way, operations
planning can then be accomplished during a weekly
planning meeting rather than the more traditional daily
planning.

CG/MOI Testing and Polarity Checks
These tests gather the required information to ensure that
the ADCS system and algorithms are provided with the
most accurate information. The polarity checks also
ensure that the sensors and actuators were installed
correctly.
Other tests that may be performed, given the specific risk
tolerance posture of the mission, these include
EMI/EMC testing, detailed ADCS testing, and payload
performance testing.

CONCLUSIONS
The majority of space organizations have evolved to be
requirements driven such that meeting mission goals,
and scope, take a level of precedence over cost and
schedule due to the limited access to space. However, as
access to space continues to expand for small satellites,
and the need for rapid capability development increases,
schedule and cost are driving mission lifecycles. These
Constraint-Based missions require tailored systems
engineering practices that prioritize demonstrated
capability with a lower performance over
undemonstrated capability with higher performance. The
small satellite community should adopt a process that
verifies mission success allowing the mission validation
to occur on orbit allowing rapid demonstration of
capability.

Vibration Testing
More traditional systems may test all components
independently prior to integration and modeling the
integrated system prior to full vehicle vibration testing.
Constraint-driven missions can realize significant cost
and schedule savings by only vibration testing the fully
integrated system and limiting modal modeling to only
extremely sensitive components.
Thermal Vacuum Testing
Testing the system under both hot and cold vacuum
ensures that the system will perform as designed on orbit.
While the duration and number of cycles can vary from
mission to mission, limiting the number of cycles can
significantly reduce the cost and schedule.
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